Enjoy!
Tweet
18 January 2012
Happy 2012
Happy New Year! OK, it is horribly late... But I wish you all a pleasant new year 2012. I especially wish it to be better than 2011, which was an execrable year in so many ways. 
New year means new good resolutions. This apple is there as a symbol of sound(er) eating and healthy diet...
Enjoy!
Tweet
Enjoy!
Tweet
07 October 2011
Two Party System
Democracy (as understood in the Western concept of the word) has existed in all kinds of ways and institutional constructions. All of these constructions have included the idea that one of the fundamental rights of the citizens was to organize themselves in political structures conveniently called "parties". Gathering of people interested in the same ideas, as well as vehicles for the personal ambitions of some, parties have always been a fixture of democracy (and even of many non-democratic regimes). The European institutions recognized this too and parties exist at the European level, even though they have some difficulty to be recognized by the EU polity.
This said, there are fundamental differences between the party set up in the different democratic countries. In some countries, they are simple associations of citizens, with little more difference with a sport club than their objectives. In others, they are an integral part of the institutions, with a status well apart from other groups of citizens. Another major distinction between party systems is simply their number in a a given country. Some countries have essentially a two party system (to simplify, 'left vs. right"), some have a three party one and many if not most have a multiple party system. It would be extremely disingenuous to pretend that these difference have no effect on the political institutions and the political life of a country. On the contrary, these differences actually contribute to define the institutions and are in turn defined by them. But, unlike the constitution of a country, the party set up is rarely or never fixed. This can have tremendous and unexpected effects.
Let's take a couple of example. The USA, for instance, have a two party system, very rigid and highly integrated in the country's institutions. Parties there are in no way ordinary associations, but there is simply little political life outside of the Republican and Democrat parties. The United Kingdom recently evolved from a quasi two party system to a theoretical three party one. Although we could argue that the UKIP is a 4th player, it weighs too little in the country's institutions to seriously threaten the Tories, Labour and LibDem hold on power. France, Germany or the Netherlands are all multiple party set up, at least to a point. While the weight of the different Dutch parties can be reasonably considered as truly variable, France and Germany both have a very dominant right and left parties (UMP and PS in France, CDU-CSU and SPD for Germany). But even in France and Germany, smaller parties can and do actually play a role, would it only be the "king maker" one between the dominant right and left formations.
It is interesting to see that the current massive global crisis which has struck the Western world has affected the political life of these countries very differently, depending on their party set up. Netherlands has reacted to the crisis in a fairly classic way. The balance between the 15 various parties has been strongly modified, but in the end the power didn't change hands much. The crisis first brought a centre government (Labour, Christian Democrats and Conservative), then a slight sway to the right (Christian Democrats, Conservative and National-Populists) as electors blamed the first post-crisis coalition for its inefficiency. In general, it was a typical answer of a multi-polar system: it was easy to adapt because the multiple choices meant mutilple solution and easy adaptation to the new reality. The down side of this greater adaptability of course is that it gave access to power to a fringe party. This can typically not happen in a two or three party system.
In the USA, the strength or rather sheer weight of the two parties is so huge that a crisis can only make the power change from one party to the other. The crisis (amongst other factors) contributed to Obama's victory and did put the Democrats in power. However, their relative inability to tackle problems quickly and the fact that the crisis lasted longer than they thought did bring Republicans a victory in the House after only two years. It is fairly clear for an external observer that the US bipolar system has the advantage of stability. But it is also fairly obvious that it suffers greatly, as a downside, of its rigidity. Outside of the two main parties, there is no room for political power. One can have influence without them, but not exercise power. It also means that the US institutional system has too much inertia and is unable to give a speedy and adequate answer to a major crisis. The result of this is what we can observe on our TV screens: besides the Republican and Democrat parties, citizens organize themselves in a series of alternatives. Originally, the Libertarian organisation had this role, but we now see also the Tea Party, the Occupy Wall Street organisation, the Coffee Party, and so on. Obviously, the American institutions being what they are, these organisations can only exist in reference and interdependence with the two traditional parties. They are opposed to them, yet they are forced to ally with them to exist in the political landscape and not only in the streets.
While both set up have their advantages and disadvantages, I have to say that I find the US system extremely dangerous. When, in a democratic society, citizens feel so estranged towards traditional politic organisations that they have to get down to the streets to get heard, something can go very wrong. Democracy's principle is to give legitimacy to the government by having the citizens feel represented by it. The two party system inadequation, rigidity and slow answer to crisis put this democratic basis into jeopardy.
Tweet
This said, there are fundamental differences between the party set up in the different democratic countries. In some countries, they are simple associations of citizens, with little more difference with a sport club than their objectives. In others, they are an integral part of the institutions, with a status well apart from other groups of citizens. Another major distinction between party systems is simply their number in a a given country. Some countries have essentially a two party system (to simplify, 'left vs. right"), some have a three party one and many if not most have a multiple party system. It would be extremely disingenuous to pretend that these difference have no effect on the political institutions and the political life of a country. On the contrary, these differences actually contribute to define the institutions and are in turn defined by them. But, unlike the constitution of a country, the party set up is rarely or never fixed. This can have tremendous and unexpected effects.
Let's take a couple of example. The USA, for instance, have a two party system, very rigid and highly integrated in the country's institutions. Parties there are in no way ordinary associations, but there is simply little political life outside of the Republican and Democrat parties. The United Kingdom recently evolved from a quasi two party system to a theoretical three party one. Although we could argue that the UKIP is a 4th player, it weighs too little in the country's institutions to seriously threaten the Tories, Labour and LibDem hold on power. France, Germany or the Netherlands are all multiple party set up, at least to a point. While the weight of the different Dutch parties can be reasonably considered as truly variable, France and Germany both have a very dominant right and left parties (UMP and PS in France, CDU-CSU and SPD for Germany). But even in France and Germany, smaller parties can and do actually play a role, would it only be the "king maker" one between the dominant right and left formations.
It is interesting to see that the current massive global crisis which has struck the Western world has affected the political life of these countries very differently, depending on their party set up. Netherlands has reacted to the crisis in a fairly classic way. The balance between the 15 various parties has been strongly modified, but in the end the power didn't change hands much. The crisis first brought a centre government (Labour, Christian Democrats and Conservative), then a slight sway to the right (Christian Democrats, Conservative and National-Populists) as electors blamed the first post-crisis coalition for its inefficiency. In general, it was a typical answer of a multi-polar system: it was easy to adapt because the multiple choices meant mutilple solution and easy adaptation to the new reality. The down side of this greater adaptability of course is that it gave access to power to a fringe party. This can typically not happen in a two or three party system.
In the USA, the strength or rather sheer weight of the two parties is so huge that a crisis can only make the power change from one party to the other. The crisis (amongst other factors) contributed to Obama's victory and did put the Democrats in power. However, their relative inability to tackle problems quickly and the fact that the crisis lasted longer than they thought did bring Republicans a victory in the House after only two years. It is fairly clear for an external observer that the US bipolar system has the advantage of stability. But it is also fairly obvious that it suffers greatly, as a downside, of its rigidity. Outside of the two main parties, there is no room for political power. One can have influence without them, but not exercise power. It also means that the US institutional system has too much inertia and is unable to give a speedy and adequate answer to a major crisis. The result of this is what we can observe on our TV screens: besides the Republican and Democrat parties, citizens organize themselves in a series of alternatives. Originally, the Libertarian organisation had this role, but we now see also the Tea Party, the Occupy Wall Street organisation, the Coffee Party, and so on. Obviously, the American institutions being what they are, these organisations can only exist in reference and interdependence with the two traditional parties. They are opposed to them, yet they are forced to ally with them to exist in the political landscape and not only in the streets.
While both set up have their advantages and disadvantages, I have to say that I find the US system extremely dangerous. When, in a democratic society, citizens feel so estranged towards traditional politic organisations that they have to get down to the streets to get heard, something can go very wrong. Democracy's principle is to give legitimacy to the government by having the citizens feel represented by it. The two party system inadequation, rigidity and slow answer to crisis put this democratic basis into jeopardy.
Tweet
06 October 2011
European solidarity?
Greece, the land where democracy was invented, entered the European Union in 1981. While we Europeans are all confronted to the worst existential crisis since the Rome treaty, Greece has taken the brunt of it. I am using the word "existential" on purpose, to avoid "economic". Indeed, I want to prove, by use of the Greek example, that the crisis we are currently experiencing is only economic in its consequences. It is, in my opinion, before anything else a political crisis of solidarity. To state the obvious, it is by far not just a European crisis, but the actual chain of events unravelling in Europe during this crisis is beyond any doubt a European specificity and a threat to the existence of our regional organisation.
There are clearly several levels to the catastrophic chain of events which began with the sub-prime crash in 2008, the banking failures, the companies bankruptcies, the "bear" stock markets, the currency crisis and now the defaulting countries. There is an international crisis of the deregulated markets, obviously. It was not sop much a failure of capitalism, as was written by some leftist journalists, but a perversion of its mechanisms. Capitalism is a system which can be extremely efficient if two factors are present: a high level of information of the economic agents and a very low level of competition distortion. The global level of the crisis came precisely from a complete absence of both these factors. Agents began trading products where they had no visibility at all, or even where they were purposefully and massively misled. In other words, there was a massive fraud scam going on at the global level. But instead of compensating the lack of (government) regulation by an increased competition, these agents (banks, funds, traders, insurance companies and notation agencies) cooperated and colluded to avoid their individual demise. This led to their failure en masse and the need for the governments to rescue several of them (or their victims) with taxpayer money. Here already, we see that the origin of the crisis was one of fraud, essentially, a criminal enterprise, with economic consequences and all too human victims.
However, the global level crisis was followed by a local or country level one. Several of the countries which had to "bail out" financial institutions found themselves unable to meet their own obligations. This happened because they had to cover extraordinary expenses to recapitalize these financial institutions and because the economic crisis at the global level reduced at the same time their fiscal income. Extreme examples of such crisis include countries which had relatively sound budgetary principles such as Iceland, Portugal or Ireland, but also ones which did not. Greece is currently the archetypal example of such countries. Like France, the USA or Italy, its budgets were not balanced before the crisis. Unlike France and Italy, after the crisis they became unsustainable, because the weight of the public debt interests could not reasonably be covered by the country taxes. Like Mexico or Brazil in the 80's, Greece became technically insolvent.
Unlike these countries, the Greek government had consistently lied about it. The previous PASOK government had lied about its budget deficit before the country adhesion to the Eurozone, the Nea Democratia government kept lying about it after it came to power. To the credit of the current PASOK government, it disclosed the extent of the countries woes when it came to power in 2009. Unfortunately, it was already too late for any realistic local salvage plan. Greece has a poorly efficient public sector, an incredibly expensive military (second only to the USA in terms of budget to GDP ratio and first in NATO in terms of enlisted men and women in the army). It has way too many nationalized companies and not enough free competition. Its fiscal efficiency is poor, to say the least, with the richest people paying too little taxes (or evading them all together). Last but not least, the Church weighs enormously in political affairs without contributing to the economy.
A regional or international solution had to be found. Because of its membership in the European Union and its participation in the Euro single currency, the Greek problem quickly became a European problem. The Greek debt was a Euro debt and its crisis, by weakening the Euro, soon threatened to spread like a contagious disease. Namely, other European countries with the same currency and similar budget issues could face the same reluctance from lenders to give them any credit. And there lies precisely my point. Notation agencies and international banks did treat (to a certain extent) Europe as a apart entity. With some reason, they calculated that the European countries could not ignore the Greek issue (or the similar Portuguese and Irish ones). European banks had lent vast amounts to Greece, and so had sovereign entities. A Greek default would weaken or even threaten them. By their assessments and notations, they clearly sent the message that they expected a regional answer to a potentially regional problem. Although they had themselves some responsibility in the problem (contributing to aggravate it), it can not be denied that they had a point. Greece and the other European Union member states are linked by several treaties and by their common institutions. They share a money and their economies, via the common market are integrated in a very extensive way.
Yet, it is not so much an economic answer that these lenders wanted to see. It was a political one. In petto, this was a test of political will, of institutional resilience and (for some) of statesmanship. And it is, I think, stating the obvious again to write that this test was lamentably failed. While some, like Jean-Claude Juncker or Jean-Claude Trichet, did raise to meet the challenge where and when they could, most of the "usual suspects" showed a total lack of political sense. Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, but also for instance the Slovakian and Finish leaders (Iveta Radicova and Jyriki Katainen respectively), did not rise to show European leadership. They cringed and cowered on national issues, nationalistic ones even. Europe, as an idea as well as an institutional construction, is based on solidarity. Until 2008, it never had to face any substantial crisis. The Cold War never turned hot. The fall of the Berlin wall was more an opportunity than a crisis. The Bush led "War on Terror" (tm) always was an American thing, even if the Labour UK government demonstrated high levels of servility in it. None of these issues was a true crisis, because none of them threatened the livelihood of the European citizens. Even the defeat of the European constitutional referendum was mostly a technocratic issue. While citizens were consulted and generally rebelled against it, it did not affect them enough to even take the pain of trying to understand it or vote for anything else than local political reflex.
But nowadays, the crisis is well there. The refusal from international lenders to give sustainable interest rates to Greece and now other EU countries is actually threatening the life of millions of European citizens. And yet, the European answer has oscillated between hesitations and chauvinism. Europe, understood as a collective of member-states, has spectacularly failed the first serious test that was presented to it. Even if Greece is saved (and it will, sooner or later, but at which cost?), the current European institutional "house" is dying. It is dying from the poison that its own lack of solidarity is producing.
It might take a while, but the lessons of this bitter event have to be taken. The faster the better. It is not realistic to expect a vague coalition of member-states to present anything structured in answer to a regional or international crisis. It is not realistic to expect a lone country to play the role of scapegoat for the failures of international organisations, even if this country's government clearly dug its own grave. It is even less realistic to expect citizens to stay still or even to have a rational answer to all this. It might be time to build actual institutions to give Europe the political reactivity that its economic sheer mass requires. We can't continue to have such a massive truck with so many drivers and so little direction. Europe needs political leadership supported by democratic legitimacy and it needs it now. It is not time for less Europe, it is time for a stronger and faster one. Now is the time...
Tweet
There are clearly several levels to the catastrophic chain of events which began with the sub-prime crash in 2008, the banking failures, the companies bankruptcies, the "bear" stock markets, the currency crisis and now the defaulting countries. There is an international crisis of the deregulated markets, obviously. It was not sop much a failure of capitalism, as was written by some leftist journalists, but a perversion of its mechanisms. Capitalism is a system which can be extremely efficient if two factors are present: a high level of information of the economic agents and a very low level of competition distortion. The global level of the crisis came precisely from a complete absence of both these factors. Agents began trading products where they had no visibility at all, or even where they were purposefully and massively misled. In other words, there was a massive fraud scam going on at the global level. But instead of compensating the lack of (government) regulation by an increased competition, these agents (banks, funds, traders, insurance companies and notation agencies) cooperated and colluded to avoid their individual demise. This led to their failure en masse and the need for the governments to rescue several of them (or their victims) with taxpayer money. Here already, we see that the origin of the crisis was one of fraud, essentially, a criminal enterprise, with economic consequences and all too human victims.
Unlike these countries, the Greek government had consistently lied about it. The previous PASOK government had lied about its budget deficit before the country adhesion to the Eurozone, the Nea Democratia government kept lying about it after it came to power. To the credit of the current PASOK government, it disclosed the extent of the countries woes when it came to power in 2009. Unfortunately, it was already too late for any realistic local salvage plan. Greece has a poorly efficient public sector, an incredibly expensive military (second only to the USA in terms of budget to GDP ratio and first in NATO in terms of enlisted men and women in the army). It has way too many nationalized companies and not enough free competition. Its fiscal efficiency is poor, to say the least, with the richest people paying too little taxes (or evading them all together). Last but not least, the Church weighs enormously in political affairs without contributing to the economy.
A regional or international solution had to be found. Because of its membership in the European Union and its participation in the Euro single currency, the Greek problem quickly became a European problem. The Greek debt was a Euro debt and its crisis, by weakening the Euro, soon threatened to spread like a contagious disease. Namely, other European countries with the same currency and similar budget issues could face the same reluctance from lenders to give them any credit. And there lies precisely my point. Notation agencies and international banks did treat (to a certain extent) Europe as a apart entity. With some reason, they calculated that the European countries could not ignore the Greek issue (or the similar Portuguese and Irish ones). European banks had lent vast amounts to Greece, and so had sovereign entities. A Greek default would weaken or even threaten them. By their assessments and notations, they clearly sent the message that they expected a regional answer to a potentially regional problem. Although they had themselves some responsibility in the problem (contributing to aggravate it), it can not be denied that they had a point. Greece and the other European Union member states are linked by several treaties and by their common institutions. They share a money and their economies, via the common market are integrated in a very extensive way.
Yet, it is not so much an economic answer that these lenders wanted to see. It was a political one. In petto, this was a test of political will, of institutional resilience and (for some) of statesmanship. And it is, I think, stating the obvious again to write that this test was lamentably failed. While some, like Jean-Claude Juncker or Jean-Claude Trichet, did raise to meet the challenge where and when they could, most of the "usual suspects" showed a total lack of political sense. Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, but also for instance the Slovakian and Finish leaders (Iveta Radicova and Jyriki Katainen respectively), did not rise to show European leadership. They cringed and cowered on national issues, nationalistic ones even. Europe, as an idea as well as an institutional construction, is based on solidarity. Until 2008, it never had to face any substantial crisis. The Cold War never turned hot. The fall of the Berlin wall was more an opportunity than a crisis. The Bush led "War on Terror" (tm) always was an American thing, even if the Labour UK government demonstrated high levels of servility in it. None of these issues was a true crisis, because none of them threatened the livelihood of the European citizens. Even the defeat of the European constitutional referendum was mostly a technocratic issue. While citizens were consulted and generally rebelled against it, it did not affect them enough to even take the pain of trying to understand it or vote for anything else than local political reflex.
But nowadays, the crisis is well there. The refusal from international lenders to give sustainable interest rates to Greece and now other EU countries is actually threatening the life of millions of European citizens. And yet, the European answer has oscillated between hesitations and chauvinism. Europe, understood as a collective of member-states, has spectacularly failed the first serious test that was presented to it. Even if Greece is saved (and it will, sooner or later, but at which cost?), the current European institutional "house" is dying. It is dying from the poison that its own lack of solidarity is producing.
It might take a while, but the lessons of this bitter event have to be taken. The faster the better. It is not realistic to expect a vague coalition of member-states to present anything structured in answer to a regional or international crisis. It is not realistic to expect a lone country to play the role of scapegoat for the failures of international organisations, even if this country's government clearly dug its own grave. It is even less realistic to expect citizens to stay still or even to have a rational answer to all this. It might be time to build actual institutions to give Europe the political reactivity that its economic sheer mass requires. We can't continue to have such a massive truck with so many drivers and so little direction. Europe needs political leadership supported by democratic legitimacy and it needs it now. It is not time for less Europe, it is time for a stronger and faster one. Now is the time...
Tweet
04 October 2011
Graphic changes
This week, i have decided to work on my blog again. I am happy to see that Blogger added all kinds of new features. One of the most important for me is the possibility to add fixed pages to it (like with WordPress). This way, I don't need to maintain two different sites any more (the old fixed one and the blog). So from now on, you will be able to discover my photography work on display by clicking in the dedicated page. My poetry work is now also available on a fixed page. At the moment there is nothing really new (if you already knew my work, at least). But I will add up more stuff there soon.
I have also cleaned up the links and most of the surrounding "non core" stuff. So most links should now work and most of them still be relevant. It was badly needed, after so many of them have disappeared, been arrested or simply abandoned the public debate by becoming "invitation only" blogs (another word for the sad victory of repressive regimes on free press).
Tweet
Tweet
15 July 2011
Google+
Dear readers,
I discovered Google+ a couple of days ago, thanks to my good friend Draz. I have to say that I am quite impressed by Page's team work on this. I know, one should not compare it to Facebook, because it was not intended to compete with it. Yeah, right...
It does a lot of stuff that Facebook does not do too well, or similar stuff but slightly better. To be completely honest, it also does a lot of stuff less good than FB: refreshing is a bit random, some elements don't really display too well and posts with too many comments will take ages to load. But this is fairly acceptable for a service which just began and it got most of its functionality right from the start.
Now where Google+ shines and FB doesn't is, as many have already written, in the handling of privacy and sharing. The "Circles" that Google+ use are a brilliant system. It is slick, it works and these circles are not mutually exclusive. So you can play nicely "Set Theory" style with your contact list. Indeed, "Circles" are just the social avatars of mathematical sets. Some are there already when you sign up (Family, Friends, Acquaintances, etc.), but you can create more. So, for instance, I created one circle for my ex-colleagues, one for my current employer and one for each of my hobbies. But some of the people I have put in these four sets are also in my friends set or my acquaintances set. This gives me a near infinity of options to share information with whomever I want and with whichever precision I require.
I still think some stuff needs improvement. For instance, while the interface is very slick and easy to use, I think that post + comments still take too much space on my screen. This makes having an overview of the recent posts a bit uneasy. There also doesn't seem to be much in terms of business related areas. But I am sure it will come at the time they chose right... If I may present a suggestion to the Google+ team, I think they should concentrate on allowing more integration by the users of their own existing Google content in Google+. I am thinking of Blogger posts, Google Docs, Google Calendar events and so on. Speaking about Events, I believe it is the major way to go. No free social platform (except Meetup) ever got this right. If Google+ manages to get Event handling in a decent way, they will simply take over the social scene.
All in all, I am favourably impressed. I noticed that my time on Google+ is already largely surpassing my time on Facebook or LinkedIn. I doubt it will replace these any time soon, but it completes them nicely and I have no doubt that Google has created a very successful (not so) new social platform.
Tweet
I discovered Google+ a couple of days ago, thanks to my good friend Draz. I have to say that I am quite impressed by Page's team work on this. I know, one should not compare it to Facebook, because it was not intended to compete with it. Yeah, right...
It does a lot of stuff that Facebook does not do too well, or similar stuff but slightly better. To be completely honest, it also does a lot of stuff less good than FB: refreshing is a bit random, some elements don't really display too well and posts with too many comments will take ages to load. But this is fairly acceptable for a service which just began and it got most of its functionality right from the start.
I still think some stuff needs improvement. For instance, while the interface is very slick and easy to use, I think that post + comments still take too much space on my screen. This makes having an overview of the recent posts a bit uneasy. There also doesn't seem to be much in terms of business related areas. But I am sure it will come at the time they chose right... If I may present a suggestion to the Google+ team, I think they should concentrate on allowing more integration by the users of their own existing Google content in Google+. I am thinking of Blogger posts, Google Docs, Google Calendar events and so on. Speaking about Events, I believe it is the major way to go. No free social platform (except Meetup) ever got this right. If Google+ manages to get Event handling in a decent way, they will simply take over the social scene.
All in all, I am favourably impressed. I noticed that my time on Google+ is already largely surpassing my time on Facebook or LinkedIn. I doubt it will replace these any time soon, but it completes them nicely and I have no doubt that Google has created a very successful (not so) new social platform.
Tweet
17 March 2011
Dutch Army plans revisited
Tweet
Dear readers,
My girlfriend had a funny remark this morning about the Dutch armed forces. Apparently, the new defence budget of the Netherlands includes no replacement for its tanks or transport helicopters. She said: "what is the point of a modern army without tanks? They really should get rid of it completely if they can't do it seriously". I had to laugh but to give her the point.
I had read yesterday that its submarine forces (already reduced to three after the damages sustained by the 4th) would be scrapped too. At the same time, the Dutch Defence Ministry is reserving billions of dollar for the basic (non VTOL version) of the US made JSF. And anyone with a ounce of reason will think: WTF? Why buy an extremely expensive plane (the most expensive there is, in fact) to a non-European entity, undermining European defence? Why the version least useful for external intervention and force projection? Why on the other hand refuse to replace the materials actually useful in today's world affairs: submarines, helicopters and armour? I thought about it a little bit and no rationale reasoning came to me.
But then I realized there is a simple explanation: follow the money. The Dutch coalition is made of VVD and CDA (right wing, near to Dutch big money and business interests). Their own interest is not to improve the Dutch defence capabilities or the European coordination. Their interest is to fill in their pockets and the ones of their business friends. Search no further... I suspect that the US industrials (and particularly the ones making the JSF) are ranking highly amongst these friends.
Dear readers,
My girlfriend had a funny remark this morning about the Dutch armed forces. Apparently, the new defence budget of the Netherlands includes no replacement for its tanks or transport helicopters. She said: "what is the point of a modern army without tanks? They really should get rid of it completely if they can't do it seriously". I had to laugh but to give her the point.
But then I realized there is a simple explanation: follow the money. The Dutch coalition is made of VVD and CDA (right wing, near to Dutch big money and business interests). Their own interest is not to improve the Dutch defence capabilities or the European coordination. Their interest is to fill in their pockets and the ones of their business friends. Search no further... I suspect that the US industrials (and particularly the ones making the JSF) are ranking highly amongst these friends.
01 March 2011
Revolution extended
Tweet
Dear readers,
It is a weakness of traditional media and particularly TV stations to select and filter information in a way which will hold in a traditional 25 minutes news bulletin. Unfortunately, this means that most channels and even newspapers will simply let some important pieces fall from the prime time news. This get even worse when there is abundance of events. No time was a better example of this than the last few weeks.
All over the media, we heard about Tunisia first, then the Egyptian Revolution, then the Libyan one, and so on. But this gave us, viewers, an illusion of succession of one crisis following the other. Expressions such as "domino effect" (an old Cold War word) only served to reinforce this feeling. Worse, it created an effect of the type "tree hiding the forest". Indeed, while these countries were making the front pages and prime-time news, several other were doing just the same in complete indifference.
Some Africans in Ivory Coast rightfully took umbrage, and tweeted a CNN journalist until he relented. But beyond the odd and fun news like this (although how fun is it when dozens of people are slaughtered in the mean time?), the fact is that we keep ignoring the forest of unrest on several continents. To avoid this, I have tried to gather a simple list of them. I'll try to update it as it goes. Let's call this the "Extended Revolutions", in no particular order.
Dear readers,
It is a weakness of traditional media and particularly TV stations to select and filter information in a way which will hold in a traditional 25 minutes news bulletin. Unfortunately, this means that most channels and even newspapers will simply let some important pieces fall from the prime time news. This get even worse when there is abundance of events. No time was a better example of this than the last few weeks.
Some Africans in Ivory Coast rightfully took umbrage, and tweeted a CNN journalist until he relented. But beyond the odd and fun news like this (although how fun is it when dozens of people are slaughtered in the mean time?), the fact is that we keep ignoring the forest of unrest on several continents. To avoid this, I have tried to gather a simple list of them. I'll try to update it as it goes. Let's call this the "Extended Revolutions", in no particular order.
- Tunisia (after all, they were the spark in the powder keg).
- Ivory Coast (although chronologically before Tunisia, it did not have the same international effect)
- Egypt
- Gabon
- Cameroon
- Iran
- Lebanon
- Armenia
- China (although it took the form of a weird joke)
- Azerbaijan
- Libya
- Algeria
- Morocco
- Jordan
- Yemen
- Bahrain
- Oman
- Mauritania
- Djibouti
- Saudi Arabia
- Iraq
- Angola (unsure of this one)
22 February 2011
Europe and the Middle-East revolution
Dear readers,
After this very long pause in writing, I have been motivated by the Middle-East revolutions to put out this new piece. The main reason was my total disgust feeling when watching the reaction of European institutions and European countries to the insurrection.
I am not going to elaborate too much, but suffice to say that these reactions have varied from worried indifference to the most abject collaboration with the tyrants. I am no stranger to realpolitik and I am well aware that international politics aren't based on good feelings and kindness. Nevertheless, I think that it is the sign of a good statesman (or woman) to be able to recognize the momentum of History and at the very least to be able to capitalize on it. Our dear leaders have unfortunately shown nothing of this.
When Tunisia went into full revolutionary mode, the French government proposed to help the Tunisian dictatorship with crowd containment know-how and technology. When Egypt took the street, the only comments from German or Dutch elites was that the risk of the Muslim Brotherhood taking over was too big. It could have been a threat to... Israel. I am no Islamophile, but, let's face it, the complacency of the EU and Egypt towards Israel's apartheid policy has only made the Middle-East problems worst, not better. When Bahreini decided that they had enough, the only comment from our "lesson givers" was: beware of the pro-Iranian Shia majority. Now that Algeria and Lybia are in trouble, Berlusconi, Frattini and Schwarzenberg went very publicly on the record to express their support to Gaddafi. They were obviously terrified of a massive influx of refugees. Maltese authority were more discrete (at least they had some decency) but no less worried in their warning.
Unfortunately for all these despicable EU politicians, Bouteflika in Algeria and Gaddafi in Lybia decided to handle the matter the hard way. Algerian "security forces" (i.e. goons) simply beat up demonstrators into submission. Gaddafi forces went simply berserk on the people, shooting indiscriminately into the crowds with heavy weapons, sending its Air Force against rebelling cities and sniping people from the roofs. When Army and Air Force units refused to shoot at their own people, he used Ukrainian pilots and African mercenaries. Both are cheap and don't ask questions. The graphic videos and pictures filtering through the Lybian media shutdown are explicit enough: streets are littered with body parts and rubble. Hospitals are crowded, when they are not bombarded themselves.
One would expect from our dear politicians that they would at the very least resign. Don't hold your breath, though, that is not going to happen. Schwarzenberg (Czech Republic) was ashamed enough to say that his words had been taken out of context. In my opinion, the only lack of context (and his only excuse) was that he did not know the extent of the slaughter at the time. Anyway, honor and justice would require from them to politically fall on their swords, so to speak. That is not going to happen, so I won't hesitate: people of Europe, wake up! Demand the immediate resignation of all the politicians who knowingly lent a hand to the Maghreb tyrants (or still do so). Honestly, it won't be a big loss for Europe... And if they do not resign, let's take the street. After all, why would we always arrogantly pose ourselves in model to the Arab world? We can learn so much from it too.
After this very long pause in writing, I have been motivated by the Middle-East revolutions to put out this new piece. The main reason was my total disgust feeling when watching the reaction of European institutions and European countries to the insurrection.
I am not going to elaborate too much, but suffice to say that these reactions have varied from worried indifference to the most abject collaboration with the tyrants. I am no stranger to realpolitik and I am well aware that international politics aren't based on good feelings and kindness. Nevertheless, I think that it is the sign of a good statesman (or woman) to be able to recognize the momentum of History and at the very least to be able to capitalize on it. Our dear leaders have unfortunately shown nothing of this.
Unfortunately for all these despicable EU politicians, Bouteflika in Algeria and Gaddafi in Lybia decided to handle the matter the hard way. Algerian "security forces" (i.e. goons) simply beat up demonstrators into submission. Gaddafi forces went simply berserk on the people, shooting indiscriminately into the crowds with heavy weapons, sending its Air Force against rebelling cities and sniping people from the roofs. When Army and Air Force units refused to shoot at their own people, he used Ukrainian pilots and African mercenaries. Both are cheap and don't ask questions. The graphic videos and pictures filtering through the Lybian media shutdown are explicit enough: streets are littered with body parts and rubble. Hospitals are crowded, when they are not bombarded themselves.
One would expect from our dear politicians that they would at the very least resign. Don't hold your breath, though, that is not going to happen. Schwarzenberg (Czech Republic) was ashamed enough to say that his words had been taken out of context. In my opinion, the only lack of context (and his only excuse) was that he did not know the extent of the slaughter at the time. Anyway, honor and justice would require from them to politically fall on their swords, so to speak. That is not going to happen, so I won't hesitate: people of Europe, wake up! Demand the immediate resignation of all the politicians who knowingly lent a hand to the Maghreb tyrants (or still do so). Honestly, it won't be a big loss for Europe... And if they do not resign, let's take the street. After all, why would we always arrogantly pose ourselves in model to the Arab world? We can learn so much from it too.
23 April 2010
Denuclearization
Dear readers,
The BBC reports that Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO's chief, declared that NATO should retain nuclear capacities as long as there would be rogue regimes and terrorists threatening the Alliance. He added that such threats also made a serious anti-missile defense system all the more important.
While I completely agree with mister Rasmussen's second statement, the first one is, to say the least, debatable. The Danish former Minister is well aware of one of the reasons for this, the economic one. He addressed it in his comment, by mentioning that NATO should find a way of mutualizing the costs of such "deterrents". Denmark is indeed a member of NATO, and pays for its own expenses within the Alliance. However, very much like the Netherlands and most other NATO members (apart from France, the UK and the USA), Denmark enjoys the protection of the nuclear weapons of the three members who operates them, but without supporting any of the costs.
However, there is another reason to find mister Rasmussen comment slightly aloof. And it is the rational behind the deterrence issue. It is not very clear that nuclear weapons really were any deterrent at all, at least since the Cuban missile crisis. It is fairly obvious that even at the end of the Cold War, none of the sides was actually ready to use its nukes in a first strike against its opponent. A deterrent was thus unnecessary. Now that the Cold War is over, most states owning nukes are even less likely to use them. More importantly, Rasmussen is actually not referring to such states, but to "rogue countries and terrorist organisations". And that's where the logic is flawed. Rogue regimes and terrorist organisations are totally uninterested in deterrence. Terrorists can not be stopped or deterred by nukes. They are ready to die and bring as many people in death with them. They simply don't care about the possibility of a nuclear answer to their threat. Actually, they would very much enjoy it. Getting more civilian people killed in the bombing is simply bonus for them and their cause.
As for rogue states, it is maybe slightly more ambivalent. But who does mister Rasmussen mean by these? Well, it's quite obvious. He means the two who are openly hostile to NATO: Iran and North Korea. One could also argue about China and Pakistan, but these two countries are not more likely to use nukes in a first strike against NATO than the USSR was at the end of the Cold War. So what about Iran and North Korea? Well, I dare say that the deterrence of our own nukes against these regimes is near to zero. These are secretive and violent regimes which routinely kill, torture, persecute and oppress their own citizens. These are leaders who live under high protection, with deep bunkers ready to shelter them in case of an attack. They are very well aware that any strike (first or second) against them with NATO nukes would only hurt the very people the NATO cares about: their civilian population. In case of an attack, these leaders would of course already be in deep shelters, well protected against nuclear missiles.
If they would threaten NATO, nukes would certainly not be the answer to the threat they pose. So mister Rasmussen, don't bother about the cost of NATO nukes. These costs could be much better used in the building of a common missile defence system. This is actually the only good idea that ever came from the former US Bush administration. NATO should stick to it and spend its money where it is really needed: in protecting its citizens against bombs, not in threatening other civilians with its own.
The BBC reports that Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO's chief, declared that NATO should retain nuclear capacities as long as there would be rogue regimes and terrorists threatening the Alliance. He added that such threats also made a serious anti-missile defense system all the more important.
While I completely agree with mister Rasmussen's second statement, the first one is, to say the least, debatable. The Danish former Minister is well aware of one of the reasons for this, the economic one. He addressed it in his comment, by mentioning that NATO should find a way of mutualizing the costs of such "deterrents". Denmark is indeed a member of NATO, and pays for its own expenses within the Alliance. However, very much like the Netherlands and most other NATO members (apart from France, the UK and the USA), Denmark enjoys the protection of the nuclear weapons of the three members who operates them, but without supporting any of the costs.
However, there is another reason to find mister Rasmussen comment slightly aloof. And it is the rational behind the deterrence issue. It is not very clear that nuclear weapons really were any deterrent at all, at least since the Cuban missile crisis. It is fairly obvious that even at the end of the Cold War, none of the sides was actually ready to use its nukes in a first strike against its opponent. A deterrent was thus unnecessary. Now that the Cold War is over, most states owning nukes are even less likely to use them. More importantly, Rasmussen is actually not referring to such states, but to "rogue countries and terrorist organisations". And that's where the logic is flawed. Rogue regimes and terrorist organisations are totally uninterested in deterrence. Terrorists can not be stopped or deterred by nukes. They are ready to die and bring as many people in death with them. They simply don't care about the possibility of a nuclear answer to their threat. Actually, they would very much enjoy it. Getting more civilian people killed in the bombing is simply bonus for them and their cause.
As for rogue states, it is maybe slightly more ambivalent. But who does mister Rasmussen mean by these? Well, it's quite obvious. He means the two who are openly hostile to NATO: Iran and North Korea. One could also argue about China and Pakistan, but these two countries are not more likely to use nukes in a first strike against NATO than the USSR was at the end of the Cold War. So what about Iran and North Korea? Well, I dare say that the deterrence of our own nukes against these regimes is near to zero. These are secretive and violent regimes which routinely kill, torture, persecute and oppress their own citizens. These are leaders who live under high protection, with deep bunkers ready to shelter them in case of an attack. They are very well aware that any strike (first or second) against them with NATO nukes would only hurt the very people the NATO cares about: their civilian population. In case of an attack, these leaders would of course already be in deep shelters, well protected against nuclear missiles.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)