Elections in Sun land

Unless you have lived under a stone for the last five years, you would know that there were elections in Greece to vote a new Parliament in. And you might know that it was the second time in a month, due to the inability of the politicians to work together for the good of the nation to form a new government.

This second round meant that the winner would be nearly automatically ensured to be able to get a majority or at least to build a coalition with only one other party. Indeed, the winner gets a bonus of 50 seats in the Assembly of 300 representatives, usually enough to make the difference. Here are the final results in English.

In this case, and while the winner, conservative Nea Democratia (ND), did clinch a relative majority, even these 50 seats were not enough and it will have to build a coalition (129 seats < 151). Nothing too bad, mind you, as the only other party which clearly announced it could work with ND was "socialist" PASOK who got enough seats to complete a solid majority (33 seats + 129 = 162 > 151). The self declared opposition party, SYRIZA, a coalition of no-communists, socialists and anarchy-unionists, got 71 seats. But the legitimacy of such a majority is extremely low. If one looks at the percentage of expressed votes, the 162 seats represent in fact 41.94% of the voices. SYRIZA would have an easy claim that, allied with parties opposed to the ND and PASOK policy, they represent more of the people. Legitimacy is a tricky thing in a democracy. As my old Constitutional Law teacher used to say, ultimate power is not in the majority in an election but in the street violence that the people can unleash if they don't feel represented.

So the real strength of ND will be its ability to attract the support (at least in the Parliament if not in the government) of another ally, in order to get this badly lacking legitimacy. ND and PASOK asked SYRIZA to join, but its leader, Alexis Tsipras, is too clever for Greece's own good and refused flatly. He knows that his popularity is only linked to his new boyish face and empty promises. If he joins the majority, he will disappear politically. So Antonis Samaras and Evangelos Venizelos (the ND and PASOK leaders respectively) will have to cut a deal with another party or two. The most obvious candidate is the smaller Democratiki Aristera (Democratic Left), a moderate party of progressive leaning technocrats. Its leader, Fotis Kouvelis, previously rejected such a deal, but concessions by ND and PASOK and opening by German negotiators could make him change his mind. Same is true for Anexartitoi Ellines (Independant Greeks), an ultra-conservative group of Church and Fatherland types.

None of these two parties got enough votes to help the future government cross the 50% votes legitimacy threshold. But, if both join, this threshold would be passed. Such a scenario is highly unlikely. To be honest, the presence of any of the two is very likely to prevent the other from joining as their ideologies are diametrically opposed. There is only so much you can ask for the good of the country...

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Politics in Greece

It is very difficult to understand Greece with North-West Europe references. Not that Greece is particularly "exotic" or "alien", but mostly because it has a rather troubled recent History that most foreigners or visiting tourists don't know well (and I was one of these poorly informed people). The political landscape in Greece used to be rather simple, at least seen from the outside, opposing since 1974 conservatives (Nea Democratia) to socialists (PASOK). Fringe smaller parties also existed, such as populist right wing LAOS (a Church and fatherland resurgence of older parties) or the older Communist KKE (pronounce koeh-koeh-A). But they never were in a position to challenge the duopoly of the two party system and the fact is that most current and numerous parties in Greece did not exist under their current form only 10 years ago.

Most of this is linked to the fact that Greece, from 1967 to 1974, was under the regime of conservative putschist colonels. Both conservative and socialist parties were created as a reaction to this regime and the communist KKE (which had been clandestine since the end of the Second World War) was only legalized at this time too. This has had a profound influence on the way Greek citizens view authority, political parties and ideologies. Parties were identified, consciously or not, in relation to their relationship with the colonels' junta (as it is called in Greece) and ideologies, behaviors, political myths and realities are also shaped by the trauma of the brutal dictature. Nationalist parties are often associated to this regime and illegal or damaging activities of leftist ones are often considered less negatively, because of their resistance to it.

All this changed in the last 10 to 5 years, and even more with the recent economic crisis. The political system has suddenly exploded, ending the dominance of the two party system. New players in the political field include radical left Syriza, Democratic Left (Aristera), Golden Dawn (neo-nazis), the ecologist Green and LAOS (Religious Nationalists). Most of these parties embody in fact, a certain modernity in the Greek system, for the better and for the worst. Indeed, all these new parties reflect issues and ideas that are found now in most other democracies, but which were prevented from expressing themselves by the two-party system. I use this term on purpose, as this "system" was not in any way a product of the Constitution of the IIIrd Hellenic Republic, but because it was, in my opinion a perversion of it. In other terms, both conservative and socialist put in place a strong nepotism and clientele system, corrupting the Greek democracy and effectively preventing the occurrence of political and ideological alternative. Of course, one should avoid excessive generalisation, and both parties certainly had honest members. But the leadership of these parties clearly and obviously maintained their power by way of services against votes and money against services. To get anything done in Greece (public or private) you would need a political support in one of these two parties. To a certain extent, this is still true today.

But the emergence and rise of other political and ideological offer, as well as the systematic failure by both traditional parties to handle the economic crisis, making it even worse, has created the current political quagmire. No party at the moment can claim any kind of majority. But more importantly, the separation between the parties no longer reflect the right or left paradigm but also the separation between old school politics and the new ways. The issue is as much generational as it is ideological. Hence the impossibility to build any coalition between parties which should, from an external point of view, be logical allies. It goes against the mentality of the politician involved but also against years of History. They are unable to handle the crisis or give coordinated answer to Greece's problems simply because there is no structure any more in Greece politics.
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Two Party System

Democracy (as understood in the Western concept of the word) has existed in all kinds of ways and institutional constructions. All of these constructions have included the idea that one of the fundamental rights of the citizens was to organize themselves in political structures conveniently called "parties". Gathering of people interested in the same ideas, as well as vehicles for the personal ambitions of some, parties have always been a fixture of democracy (and even of many non-democratic regimes). The European institutions recognized this too and parties exist at the European level, even though they have some difficulty to be recognized by the EU polity.

This said, there are fundamental differences between the party set up in the different democratic countries. In some countries, they are simple associations of citizens, with little more difference with a sport club than their objectives. In others, they are an integral part of the institutions, with a status well apart from other groups of citizens. Another major distinction between party systems is simply their number in a a given country. Some countries have essentially a two party system (to simplify, 'left vs. right"), some have a three party one and many if not most have a multiple party system. It would be extremely disingenuous to pretend that these difference have no effect on the political institutions and the political life of a country. On the contrary, these differences actually contribute to define the institutions and are in turn defined by them. But, unlike the constitution of a country, the party set up is rarely or never fixed. This can have tremendous and unexpected effects.

Let's take a couple of example. The USA, for instance, have a two party system, very rigid and highly integrated in the country's institutions. Parties there are in no way ordinary associations, but there is simply little political life outside of the Republican and Democrat parties. The United Kingdom recently evolved from a quasi two party system to a theoretical three party one. Although we could argue that the UKIP is a 4th player, it weighs too little in the country's institutions to seriously threaten the Tories, Labour and LibDem hold on power. France, Germany or the Netherlands are all multiple party set up, at least to a point. While the weight of the different Dutch parties can be reasonably considered as truly variable, France and Germany both have a very dominant right and left parties (UMP and PS in France, CDU-CSU and SPD for Germany). But even in France and Germany, smaller parties can and do actually play a role, would it only be the "king maker" one between the dominant right and left formations.

It is interesting to see that the current massive global crisis which has struck the Western world has affected the political life of these countries very differently, depending on their party set up. Netherlands has reacted to the crisis in a fairly classic way. The balance between the 15 various parties has been strongly modified, but in the end the power didn't change hands much. The crisis first brought a centre government (Labour, Christian Democrats and Conservative), then a slight sway to the right (Christian Democrats, Conservative and National-Populists) as electors blamed the first post-crisis coalition for its inefficiency. In general, it was a typical answer of a multi-polar system: it was easy to adapt because the multiple choices meant mutilple solution and easy adaptation to the new reality. The down side of this greater adaptability of course is that it gave access to power to a fringe party. This can typically not happen in a two or three party system.

In the USA, the strength or rather sheer weight of the two parties is so huge that a crisis can only make the power change from one party to the other. The crisis (amongst other factors) contributed to Obama's victory and did put the Democrats in power. However, their relative inability to tackle problems quickly and the fact that the crisis lasted longer than they thought did bring Republicans a victory in the House after only two years. It is fairly clear for an external observer that the US bipolar system has the advantage of stability. But it is also fairly obvious that it suffers greatly, as a downside, of its rigidity. Outside of the two main parties, there is no room for political power. One can have influence without them, but not exercise power. It also means that the US institutional system has too much inertia and is unable to give a speedy and adequate answer to a major crisis. The result of this is what we can observe on our TV screens: besides the Republican and Democrat parties, citizens organize themselves in a series of alternatives. Originally, the Libertarian organisation had this role, but we now see also the Tea Party, the Occupy Wall Street organisation, the Coffee Party, and so on. Obviously, the American institutions being what they are, these organisations can only exist in reference and interdependence with the two traditional parties. They are opposed to them, yet they are forced to ally with them to exist in the political landscape and not only in the streets.

While both set up have their advantages and disadvantages, I have to say that I find the US system extremely dangerous. When, in a democratic society, citizens feel so estranged towards traditional politic organisations that they have to get down to the streets to get heard, something can go very wrong. Democracy's principle is to give legitimacy to the government by having the citizens feel represented by it. The two party system inadequation, rigidity and slow answer to crisis put this democratic basis into jeopardy.
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Mauritania election "fair"?

Dear readers,

I have been following the Mauritanian elections, both via the BBC site and the excellent analysis from The Moor Next Door. So I have been a bit surprised by Le Monde latest reaction to the very expected "victory" of putschist General Ould Abdel Aziz. Of course, Le Monde simply and factually quotes a civil servant of the Quay d'Orsay (French Foreign Office) and adds together the claims of two opposition leaders that the whole thing was a sham. But it doesn't go any further, neither qualifies or measures these claims.

I am not really surprised by the French government reaction. Ould Abdel Aziz, whether this is true or not, is seen in Mauritania and abroad as a French protégé, by Moroccan proxy. Therefore, and after the lukewarm condemnation of his putsch by the French authority, nobody was expecting France to take the side of his opponents. But I am more disappointed by Le Monde's reaction. A bit of analysis is also part of a serious newspaper's work. I know that being factual is a good thing, but not even mentioning the connection between the current winner and the usual "Françafrique" circles is a little bit light for the French evening journal.

When I compare this to the in depth analysis of every rumor in the Iranian vote, I can only say that this is unbalanced reporting... Another sad day for French journalism.

Free Tibet or free China?

As usual, I prefer, dear readers, to comment on things after they have happened. Some people could call this a lazy habit, but I call it a safer one.

So here are some simple, proven facts:
- China is going to host the Olympics this year (whose boycott I support, just like I support Chiquita banana or Monsanto products boycott).
- At the occasion of the anniversary of China's invasion of Tibet, Tibetan demonstrations in Lhasa (and other regions) turned to violent anti-Han riots.
- These riots were suppressed violently and a ban on foreign press was imposed in Tibet.
- No free/critical information (even non political) can be published without dire consequences inside the Great Firewall of China.
- No free/critical information published outside the Firewall can be accessed from inside (such as this blog, for instance)
- The People's Republic of China is neither a Republic nor democratic. It is the uncontested rule of the Communist Party clique over the multitude.
- China is not a communist country, it is an oligarchy (and a very corrupt one).
- China does not tolerate any separatism, not even autonomy of peripheral regions.
- China does not tolerate freedom of religion.
- Many Tibetans are asking for independence, though the Dalai Lama (the head of their exiled government) is only asking for total religious freedom and an autonomy which would maintain its cultural and ethnic identity.
- Pro-Tibetan groups and free press activists have used the Olympic Torch relay to demonstrate against Chinese position.
- The Chinese government had promised some substantial Human Rights improvements to the Olympic Committee, ahead of the Games and in exchange for being allowed to organize them.
- None of these promises have been hold. Actually in some areas, the situation has become worse, arguably because of the Games.
- Chinese netjects (a neologism, contraction of "net" and "subjects", that I just created to replace the term "netizen" in places where citizenship is not obvious) have massively used the internet and messenger services to show their unconditional support to their government.
- Such netjects have shown no ability to hold an argumentative and rational conversation, using rather pre-digested babble and nationalistic rethorics.

My conclusion: if you want to make everyone happy (and that includes Taiwan, Macao and Hong-Kong), don't free Tibet, free China!

Kosovo-likes

Dear readers,

I usually try to resist commenting news when they are still too hot topics, but there are cases when the opportunity is too nice to be ignored. Kosovo indepen-dance is one of these. I know it is a heated debate, but it is also a perfect occasion to make a couple of useful comparisons and use the thought framework that has been presented in previous posts.

So Kosovo declared independence unilaterally, an easy shot considering the UN is administrating the Albanian populated Serbian province. Even easier because the UN administration was a de facto EU one, and most EU countries had made clear that they were ok with Kosovar's independence. What's left of Serbia, of the Serbian world (that is essentially Republika Serpska in Bosnia) and of Serbian allies (Russia and China, primarily) is of course outraged. And rightfully so, I would add, as the declaration in question as well as the recognition by the USA and most bigger EU countries is obviously in breach of most international laws. It is certainly nothing new and Russia as well as China have practiced intensively in this field too in the past (Afghanistan, Chechnya, Tibet, Taiwan, Abkhazia, etc., only to name a few).

But let's face it, they are legally right now and they are letting the world know. Serbians are enraged too, which is understandable, even considering that they are themselves partially responsible for what is now happening to them. If they had behaved a bit better with their various minorities in the past decades, they probably would still enjoy a complete national territory. Imagine that Texas would rebel and declare independence under UN/EU supervision, because the Chicanos are considered second class citizens there, and see what the US reaction would be. There would certainly be a nasty fight... Remember Alamo and all that crap. Ok, it would never happen you would say. Why? Well, for one simple reason: the USA are a strong military power and an influential diplomatic one (still) and they can ignore UN decisions and laugh at the EU if they want to. It's called the "reason of the strong" or the law of force.

And that's what happened in Kosovo, no legal process, but a succession of strength conflicts, more or less violent. Serbia oppressed ethnic Albanian Kosovars, Albanians created a guerrilla to answer this, Serbian forces and paramilitary crushed the rebellion and killed many civilians, the UN whined, the Russians laughed, NATO bombed the Serbians to smithereens and invaded Kosovo. I am not saying that it was wrong to invade Kosovo. I supported it when it happened. It is what happened afterwards which went very wrong. The international community let Kosovars think that they could get independence, despite the fact that there is absolutely no treaty, international agreement or UN charter article which allows a part of a national state to split from it if it is not a federal entity. Kosovo was not a federal republic inside Serbia, it was simply a province with an ethnic majority different from the rest of the country. The Kosovar reaction was only predictable: they declared themselves independent, despite the fact that the Serbian minority in the North of the province will never recognize an independent Kosovo government as a legal entity.

Russia and China (but also Spain, Cyprus and various other countries) were quick to denounce the move and quicker to warn other countries that recognizing Kosovo independence was opening the Pandora box. And again they were right. Basically, the EU and the USA have said to the world that Kosovo is a unique case, not an example to follow. Ridiculous: first, ethnic groups, oppressed or not in various country will only see that they can get away with an independence claim if they have the military strength to back their word; second, even if you only follow the Kosovo path exactly, that still paves the way to huge conflicts. So waht is now the guideline to break away, Kosovo style?

First, of course, there need to be some oppression and you have to make the world know about it. Because if you are being oppressed and nobody cares (like nationalities in Central Asian dictatorships, for instance), it does not count. It has to be on Western telly and it has to be easily Googled, otherwise, you can suffer in silence. Second, you have to rebel and get some military power. Having foreign sponsors (preferably Western) helps, but if you can do well on your own, it is fine too. The most difficult part is to get the UN to intervene. The UN is notoriously slow to react and if you have an enemy in the Security Council (or if your oppressor has a really good ally there) you are basically screwed. See Darfur or Palestine, for instance, it does not matter that their plight has been thousand times worse than this of the Kosovars: China is supporting Sudan and the USA are supporting Israel, so their rights will never be recognized. Also the problem is that to get the UN to react and send NATO, EU or ANZAC troops to the rescue, there must be some pretty horrible violations of Human Rights (like slaughters, genocide, tortures, etc.). You might not be ready to play that game, especially if the ones tortured or raped are family members. But sometimes, you don't have a choice... The rest of the story is a piece of cake. Once the connection with the "motherland" is severed by force, declaring independence is a matter of PR and making it look good institutionally. And now that Kosovo got it, nobody can even tell that there is no precedent.

You think that I am a cynic and a pro-genocidal Serbian? You could not be more wrong. Remember the previous posts. I don't believe in nation states. They are a product of imperialist XIXth century and European colonization. I am actually enjoying the fact that the Pandora box is open. It is only showing how obsolete the UN has become, how stupid the post World War II border intangibility rule has become. I am, by the way, not ok either with the much quoted right of people to rule themselves. It is only another disguise of the nation state principle. You can always find a subgroup to oppress. The other, the different, the guy with an accent is always the enemy. No, the true path is in supra national non-imperial systems. And if some old empires and nations must die to reach this stage, so be it. So yes, let's allow Taiwan to become officially independent, let's Palestinians have their own state(s), let's Abkhazia, Transdniestria, Kurdistan, Chechnya or Tibet be independent. Let's get rid of Corsica (if there is truly a majority for independence there), of Pays Basque or of Friesland. Who cares?

The point is, they will be independent for a while. Then they will realize that you are nothing in this globalized world if you are alone. And they will want to join the EU, the ASEAN or whichever supranational group they may realistically belong to. Then the real winner will be the citizens. That is of course if the supranational entities in question are anything else than a club of unelected people, irresponsible before their populations...

Kenya and democracy

Dear readers,

I would like to apply what I discussed last time about Europe and democracy to what is happening in Africa in general and in Kenya or Chad in particular. There is a general feeling in Europe that African countries should be democratic and that Europe should help this to happen. The reasoning behind this is simple: Africa was nearly totally colonized by European countries in the past (and until the 70's) so they now have some responsibility in helping African countries to get better. I am not going to delve into the debate about whether state aid should be given only in exchange of democratic progress. This is not the point. I would just like to discuss the idea: getting better = democracy. It is indeed a point which is strongly challenged by modern powers such as China, Russia, Iran or Saudi Arabia. They point out that exporting democracy is an ethnocentric European (or American) bias and that each culture should have its own regime.

A simple and way too basic answer to these countries criticism would be to point that it is probably no accident that all these countries don't show much about democracy themselves and are simply using this as a way of deflecting criticisms from their own shortcomings. It is a fair enough point, and sufficient to discredit the "messengers", but certainly does not address the message. By pointing out China or Iran gross violations of Human Rights, we are not answering the question. Which is in fact the eternal question about universals, civilization and culture. Nothing less.

But then, what did we learn from our latest reading? We learned that the ultimate universal (incidentally, the one which we believe is fundamental to modern democracy) is that everything should be put into discussion in a regulated but free manner. Regulation should be in the modalities of the discussion, not the topics or the expression itself. Freedom should be as defined by the old rule: "my freedom stops where begins the one of others". Civilization, as defined in Morin's book is in fact the way various cultures can dialog within this framework.

On this basis, we can revisit the criticism above. Is exporting democracy in Africa (for instance) a European ethnocentric biased idea, a politicized form of neo-colonialism, born in our sense of historical guilt? Well, I suspect that it all depends on two other questions: what do we mean by the word "democracy" and how do we actually implement the export?

Democracy is not the regime where the majority of the people rules over a minority through a voting system. This is called a Republic and, it has been proved many times in History, does not allow the respect of multiple cultures by itself. If we keep within Morin's thought framework, a Republic can function relatively well within a single autarcic culture but can not bring civilization (in the meaning we defined previously). Worse, it will not function properly in a globalized world, neither with multicultural groups. And I believe that any reader that has followed until now can see where I am going in regards to Africa: none of the current African states is a mono-cultural entity.

But again, this is not the main issue. Democracy might have very different meanings, modern political science scholars (as well as Morin himself) usually agree on one definition: it is a representative regime where the sovereignty comes from the people and where the government is responsible to the people; it is a regime where decisions are taken according to the rule of the majority but where at the same time the rights and basic freedom of the minority are respected; it is a regime which respects the integrity of each individual while the better good of the whole society is researched; last but not least, it is a regime where no citizen or category of citizens is entitled to more permanent rights or duties than any other. I know that many will dispute this definition, but it is the one this post is about, so it does not matter in principle.

The forms such a regime can take locally or according to a specific culture, the specific laws implemented to reach this state may vary immensely from one place to another and from one time to another. But these principles are the ones which correspond to the idea Morin has of Europe: a constant dialogic between principles which may seem contradictory but are in fact in permanent feedback cycles. Such a regime respects any specific cultural background while at the same time allowing the respect of any other one. Not because it ignores such backgrounds, but because it can integrate them in the daily functioning of the state.

Now we can see why places such as Kenya or Chad are suffering from such massive troubles, despite the fact that they were considered are countries with "democratic credentials". Europe exported there (from the UK and France respectively), a political model of institutions. This model was accepted (not imposed), by a local elite. But they are totally unadapted to areas where different ethnic, religious and language groups are prevalent. We exported the institutions but not the principles. We exported the democratic nation state institutions to these countries which are not based on such entities. We did not export the democratic principles there, because nobody was interested in understanding the local culture(s).

Now, if we really want to help Africa, we can send troupes, restore order or deliver aid. We may temporarily succeed. But what African countries really need is a complete institutional re-engineering. Only this will allow African people to integrate their identities as tribal groups, sub-cultures, etc. into a workable system that respects individuals but still support the society as a whole.

(Re)-thinking Europe

Dear readers,

I have just finished Edgar Morin's "Penser l'Europe" ("thinking Europe"), which is an excellent excuse for me to begin blogging again. The book will be also the opportunity for me to go a bit beyond and expose my own views on this important topic.

Edgar Morin is a French left wing philosopher and social anthropologist. His Mediterranean roots (born Edgar Nahoum in 1921, he is of Spanish and Sephardi Jewish origin) were soon hidden by his war name of Morin. Involved in the Spanish Civil War and later in the French Resistance, Morin was attracted by Marxism and was until his expulsion in 1951 a member of the French Communist Party. He is still today a known sympathizer of the center left "stream" of the French Socialist Party. More importantly, of course, he is a popular intellectual in France and even in Europe, respected by both right and left wing politicians for his open mind, immense culture and defining ideas.

It is interesting to know that Edgar Morin, as he admits himself in the book, was initially a strong opponent of the European idea but came later to recognize its vital importance. Converts are often the most enthusiastic missionaries, so it is no surprise that Edgar Morin has written this essay in an extremely convincing and didactic way.

The whole idea of the book is that Europe nearly died during the XXth century, mainly because of its internal tensions. Morin tries to understand what stands behind the European ideal (historically as well as nowadays) and why is it important to find it out. The tone is sometimes a bit precious, as Morin is often obsessed with semantics. But naming things is controlling them, by making them ours, so I guess he has a point in trying to be as precise as he can be. This aspect aside, the reading is pure pleasure. Morin manipulates concepts and ideas with ease and more importantly makes them understandable for people who don't have the same immense scientific and cultural background.

Morin sees Europe as an entity not really well defined from the geographical, cultural or ethnic point of view. He then tries to define what common points have developed and existed along History between the nations and other political organisations which have flowered on its space and which could have explained both the extraordinary expansion and global success of Europe and its terrible implosion and decadence during the XXth century. He finds them to be what he calls a "dialogic" between nihilism and creation, a permanent instability, source of progress as well as destruction. What he calls dialogic is the opposition between two ideas which are antagonistic without being contradictory or exclusive and as the same time complementary without being stable. He goes a bit further by explaining that it is this dialogic which has created the European Nation States and the modern democratic systems, but also the ideologies that have nearly destroyed Europe: Marxism and Fascism. This dialogic has also transformed Europe, both through its oppression of the rest of the world through the colonial system, and through its adoption and integration of other cultures in its own identity. Due to this, Europe has both spread its defining principles through the world and acquired a massive responsibility in doing it. The dialogic between cultures and civilization has made European civilization in some way compatible with all cultures.

This responsibility is the reason Edgar Morin wants a political Europe. He understands that to survive along these principles, Europe must be stronger (not in a military way, but in a softer, influential way) and united. Europe has hurt and changed the world all together, for better or for worse. But it now has to survive with it and in it. The Nation States have been created by the European dialogic and have been made redundant by it. We still have to invent something else to complete our cycle to the next stage, whatever it is. Otherwise, the nihilistic aspect of the dialogic will only destroy them, nothing will have been created to go beyond... Morin thinks that a Confederation (a bit along the Swiss model) could help us define what this next stage is.

But interestingly, at the end of the book, Morin gives clues. The point, according to him, is that there should not be any ideology. Europe has already created and destroyed all religions of earthly salvation. Europe has invented secularism and has proved that it is the only peaceful way to go. But it has not destroyed religions or ideologies. It has absorbed them and invented a system where all systems can coexist without facing annihilation. Our habit of facing the ultimate Void (and surviving it) has given us this amazing ability. Call it democracy if you want (though it is a tricky word to employ here, so much has it been misused), it does not matter. It is a way of handling public matters which solves the problem of power. No other system has done it. Of course, none is perfect either, and our democratic system could see many improvements. But Europe's mission, its new creation process, could be to defend it against the permanent entropy of the Void, and to propose it to the rest of the world that we infected with our own dialogic. Spreading democracy (what a terribly dangerous slogan) could become an ultimate goal for a future European Union.

The point that I would like to add to Morin's analysis is that it does not need to be disruptive. It does not need to be disruptive to the European States. They are going to disappear a way or another, swallowed by this new Void that is globalisation. They can understand that it is not too late for them to accept this kind of immortality. But more importantly, it does not need to be disruptive for the rest of the world. They can understand that Europe has now permanently abandoned any aggressive expansionism. What they can now also understand is that the system that we are offering (for free, so to say) is not exclusive of their own cultures or of their own contribution to civilization. It is the whole point of the democratic process that it is is not ethnocentric. It is not attacking any faith, any social system neither any form of expression. The democratic system only basis is that there should be a rule rather than chaos and that the rule does not need to be any heavier than needed to respect each group or individual. For this reason, it is the ultimate universal. The universal that includes all particularities.